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Abstract
This paper estimates a business cycle model with endogenous ￿rm entry by matching impulse
responses to a monetary policy shock in US data. Our VAR includes net business formation,
pro￿ts and markups. We evaluate two channels through which entry may in￿ uence the monetary
transmission process. Through the competition e⁄ect, the arrival of new entrants makes the
demand for existing goods more elastic, and thus lowers desired markups and prices. Through
the variety e⁄ect, increased ￿rm and product entry raises consumption utility and thereby lowers
the cost of living. This implies higher markups and, through the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
lower in￿ ation. While the proposed model does a good job at matching the observed dynamics,
it generates insu¢ cient volatility of markups and pro￿ts. Estimates of standard parameters are
largely una⁄ected by the introduction of ￿rm entry. Our results lend support to the variety
e⁄ect; however, we ￿nd no evidence for the competition e⁄ect.
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11 Introduction
This paper investigates how the extensive margin alters the monetary transmission mechanism by
estimating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with endogenous ￿rm entry.
Recent work on business cycle analysis puts forward ￿rm and product turnover as an important
factor a⁄ecting the transmission of shocks, see for example Bilbiie et al (2007) and Bergin and
Corsetti (2008). This research has been mainly theoretical up to now, creating a need for empirical
model validation. We contribute to ￿lling this gap by answering three questions. First, how
well does the model replicate the dynamics of pro￿ts, markups and entry? These variables are
typically ignored by standard DSGE models. Second, how does endogenous entry a⁄ect the relative
importance of di⁄erent frictions in the transmission of monetary policy shocks? Bilbiie et al (2007)
suggest that the stock of ￿rms, through its sluggish adjustment to shocks, is a source of endogenous
propagation that increases in￿ ation persistence, thereby reducing the importance of price rigidities.
Finally, we evaluate two channels through which entry might dampen in￿ ation: the competition
e⁄ect and the love of variety hypothesis. We explain these two e⁄ects in turn.
First, when there are only few producers in an industry, the arrival of a new entrant can lead to
stronger competition, which reduces the price markups that ￿rms are able to charge. This ￿ competi-
tion e⁄ect￿of entry has been documented in the industrial organisation literature by Campbell and
Hopenhayn (2005). It improves the capacity of business cycle models to replicate the unconditional
moments of markups and pro￿ts, see Colciago and Etro (2010). Standard models predict that de-
sired markups - the di⁄erence between prices and marginal costs in the absence of price rigidities -
are constant. In contrast, the competition e⁄ect introduces variations in desired markups which are
positively related to in￿ ation. Cecioni (2010) shows that a rise in the number of ￿rms signi￿cantly
lowers US in￿ ation.
Second, if consumer preferences display ￿ love of variety￿ , this implies that a larger range of available
products raises utility. Assuming that each entrant introduces a new di⁄erentiated good into the
market, ￿rm entry is associated with a more diverse consumption bundle. Consequently, a cost-
of-living index that takes proper account of the variety e⁄ect, by tracking the composition of the
consumption basket, should fall. If the prices of individual goods are unchanged while the price
index falls, markups and pro￿ts increase. Under price stickiness, the markup and in￿ ation are
negatively related through the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. Thus, the variety e⁄ect implies
that an increase in the number of ￿rms has a negative e⁄ect on in￿ ation. The Dixit and Stiglitz
2(1977) preference speci￿cation adopted by the vast majority of business cycle models displays love
of variety. In addition, Broda and Weinstein (2010) present scanner data evidence suggesting that
the variety e⁄ect gives rise to a signi￿cant bias in the US price index.
Using US data, we estimate a structural VAR with net business formation, markups and real pro￿ts
in addition to a set of standard macroeconomic variables (real GDP, real investment, real consump-
tion, wage in￿ ation, price in￿ ation, and the interest rate). We identify a monetary policy shock
using a conventional recursive method. The resulting impulse response functions are presented in
Section 2.
We then develop a medium-sized DSGE model with endogenous entry that we subsequently confront
with the data. The model extends Bilbiie et al (2007) to include wage rigidities, physical capital
investment, indexation of prices and wages, investment adjustment costs, variable capital utilisation,
working capital and habit persistence. Section 3 lays out the linearised model.
As explained in Section 4, we estimate the model using a minimum distance estimation (MDE)
approach. More speci￿cally, we search for the parameter values that minimise the distance between
the model-based and the VAR-based impulse responses functions. Our exercise is comparable to
Christiano et al (2005).
In Section 5, we discuss the estimation results. First, we evaluate the performance of the model at
replicating the VAR impulse responses, in particular of net business formation, pro￿ts and markups.
Second, we assess whether and how our parameter estimates are modi￿ed by the introduction of
entry in the model. To do so, we compare our estimation results to an estimated model without
entry. Third, we evaluate the two channels of how entry a⁄ects in￿ ation: the love of variety e⁄ect
and the competition e⁄ect. Finally, we report the results of various counterfactual exercises.
Our ￿ndings, summarised in Section 6, are the following. The model does a very good job at
matching the empirical responses of all variables to monetary policy shocks. However, a substantial
part of the volatility of markups and pro￿ts remains unexplained. The introduction of ￿rm entry
does not signi￿cantly alter the estimates of standard model parameters. Our results support the
love of variety hypothesis, but not the competition e⁄ect.
2 SVAR Evidence
This section presents evidence on the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to a contractionary
monetary policy shock. During the MDE procedure, these impulse response functions (IRFs) cor-
respond to the empirical moments the model has to replicate. The recursively identi￿ed structural
3VAR (SVAR) includes the following variables: real GDP, real investment, real consumption, wage
in￿ ation, price in￿ ation, net business formation, corporate pro￿ts, markups, commodity prices and
the nominal interest rate. Our model-consistent markup measure is inversely related to the labour
share.1 The purpose of using commodity prices in the regression is to mitigate the price puzzle by


































The data series are listed in Table 1. A detailed description of the data sources is provided in
Table 2. The SVAR model is estimated using US quarterly data over the period 1954Q4-1995Q2.
The sample is not updated due to a lack of more recent data on net business formation. All the
variables are linearly detrended. First, we estimate the following canonical VAR(p) model
xt = ￿1xt￿1 + ::: + ￿pxt￿p + "t;
where xt is an (n￿1) data vector with n = 10, p is the maximum lag (set to p = 4) and "t ￿ iid(0;￿),
where ￿ is a symmetric positive de￿nite matrix. Second, we identify monetary policy shocks. The
relation between the reduced form residuals "t and the structural innovations ￿t can be expressed
by the linear combination
A"t = ￿t;
where A is a nonsingular matrix. We adopt a recursive identi￿cation strategy by which all variables
are included in the information set of the monetary authority and react to a monetary policy shock
with a one-period lag. This implies that A is lower triangular.
The empirical (n ￿ 1) vector of IRFs of the variables to a monetary policy shock j periods ago,






1See Appendix 1 for details.
2Their dynamics are not reported here since they are not included in the model￿ s estimation process.
4where ￿R
t is the structural innovation corresponding to the line associated with the Federal Funds
rate and ￿ is de￿ned as
￿ = vec(￿0;:::;￿h);
where the vec(￿) operator transforms an (n ￿ m) matrix into an (nm ￿ 1) vector by stacking the
columns of the original matrix and h is the ￿nal horizon set to h = 20 quarters.3 Let ^ ￿T denote
the empirical estimate of ￿, resulting from the estimated VAR model where T is the sample size.
[ insert Figure 1 here ]
Figure 1 exhibits the estimated IRFs to a contractionary one-standard-deviation monetary policy
shock. The observed dynamics of most variables are well-known. After an initial hike, the interest
rate declines gradually, reaching steady state after about two years. Wage and price in￿ ation are
characterised by a negative hump-shaped response, reaching their lowest point only after the interest
rate is back to its pre-shock level. Capital investment, consumption and output also fall gradually
before returning to steady state in a hump-shaped fashion, though displaying less persistence than
wage and price in￿ ation. Capital investment decreases more than output, which in turn falls more
than consumption. Regarding the extensive margin, we observe that the response of net ￿rm entry
is similar in shape and magnitude to that of capital investment. This is in line with Bergin and
Corsetti (2008), Uusk￿la (2008) and Lewis (2009). Real pro￿ts also feature a downward hump-
shaped pattern that is signi￿cant over two years. The response of markups, despite not being
very accurately estimated, appears to be procyclical on impact and countercyclical over medium
horizons. In the following, we develop a DSGE model with the goal of accounting quantitatively
for the observed dynamics.
3 Model
Our starting point is the model of Bilbiie et al (2007), BGM hereafter, which features endogenous
entry of ￿rms subject to a ￿xed labour requirement, a constant ￿rm exit rate, and sticky prices ￿
la Rotemberg (1982).
In our model, ￿rm entry a⁄ects in￿ ation in two ways. First, an increase in the number of di⁄er-
entiated products lowers the welfare-based price index through the so-called variety e⁄ect. When
preferences display love of variety, a more diverse consumption bundle gives rise to higher utility
3The lines corresponding to predetermined variables for the monetary shock are zero in vector ￿0. Thus, they
are removed from vector ￿ before estimation.
5and therefore it costs less to attain a given welfare level. Holding nominal product prices constant,
markups rise. Since markups and in￿ ation are negatively related under price stickiness, the variety
e⁄ect implies that entry dampens in￿ ation. Second, as in Floetotto and Jaimovich (2008), we allow
for strategic interactions between ￿rms, resulting in a goods price markup that depends negatively
on the number of competitors.4 This so-called competition e⁄ect, combined with pro-cyclical entry,
makes markups countercyclical, which could help to capture the medium-run markup movement
observed in Figure 1. In the industrial organisation literature, there is evidence of such a relation-
ship, see Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005). Higher competitive pressure and lower desired markups
due to entry reduce in￿ ation. Cecioni (2010) ￿nds evidence for such an e⁄ect in US data. The
estimation procedure will help us to test the relevance of these two e⁄ects in the transmission of
monetary policy shocks.
We add several empirically motivated frictions to make the model estimable, in line with Christiano
et al (2005). These are external habit persistence in consumption, monopolistic competition in
labour markets and sticky wages, price and wage indexation, physical capital to produce ￿rms and
intermediate goods, adjustment costs in intensive and extensive margin investment, variable capital
utilisation and working capital.
The equilibrium is symmetric such that all households and all ￿rms are identical. In addition,
the timing of events is consistent with the recursive identi￿cation scheme adopted in the previous
section. This means that all the optimisation decisions of households and ￿rms are made before the
realisation of the monetary policy shock, except household decisions concerning assets. This spec-
i￿cation implies that production, investment, consumption, prices, wages and ￿rm entry decisions
are predetermined with respect to the shock.5
Below, we lay out the model in linearised form.6 A hat above a variable denotes its deviation from
the deterministic steady state. A variable without a hat or a time subscript denotes its steady state
level.
4We do not adopt a translog preference speci￿cation as in BGM (2007), but note that such a model is observa-
tionally equivalent to ours.
5To be precise, all variables in t (except the interest rate) are chosen on the basis of information in period t ￿ 1,
including forward variables Et fxt+1g , where Et f￿g is the expectation operator conditional on information available
at t.
6For a full derivation, see the model appendix available at http://sites.google.com/site/vivienjlewis.
63.1 Firms
There is a ￿xed range of industries of measure 1, indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Within each industry, there
is a mass Nt of ￿rms, each producing one di⁄erentiated intermediate good, indexed by f 2 [0;Nt].
The ￿rms￿intermediate goods are bundled into an industry good according to a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) aggregator, with elasticity ￿f. The ￿nal good is a CES composite of the
industry goods which have an elasticity of substitution ￿i.
Suppose for now that nominal rigidities are absent. We assume that each industry is an oligopolistic
market. The number of ￿rms is small, such that each ￿rm takes into account the e⁄ect of its pricing
decision on the industry price. The type-(i;f) ￿rm takes as given the prices of other ￿rms in the
industry and the price levels of other industries. Strategic interactions between ￿rms imply that
the price elasticity of demand (multiplied by ￿1) is given by 7
"
yp




Equation (1) shows that for ￿f > ￿i, the ￿rms￿price setting power is eroded by the arrival of
new entrants, such that their desired markup falls. Recall that the desired markup is the markup
that ￿rms charge optimally when there are no price setting frictions. In a standard New Keynesian
model, it is constant over time. Broda and Weinstein (2006) present evidence that empirically, goods
are less substitutable across industries than within an industry, such that ￿f > ￿i is a reasonable
assumption. Consider the steady state markup,
￿ =
"yp (N)
"yp (N) ￿ 1
.






The parameter ￿ measures the competition e⁄ect of entry. If ￿ > 0, more ￿rms imply a lower
markup in steady state. The competition e⁄ect vanishes if ￿ = 0. As we shall see below, the
competition e⁄ect has an impact on the model￿ s short-run in￿ ation dynamics.
Intermediate ￿rms set prices as a markup b ￿t over marginal costs,
b ￿t = b ￿t + c mct, (2)
7This expression is obtained by di⁄erentiating the demand for ￿rm (i;f)￿ s goods with respect to its price and
assuming symmetry across ￿rms. See model appendix for details.
7where c mct denotes the real marginal cost and b ￿t is the product price relative to the welfare-based
price index, i.e. ￿t = pt=Pt. In a model with endogenous ￿rm entry, the relative product price of
an intermediate good, denoted by pt, di⁄ers from the welfare-based consumer price index Pt when
the latter incorporates the variety e⁄ect. More precisely, the real product price is related to the
number of ￿rms through
b ￿t = (￿v ￿ 1) b Nt, (3)
where ￿v ￿ 1 captures the degree of ￿ love of variety￿de￿ned as the increase in consumption utility
from spreading a certain amount of consumption over a greater number of di⁄erentiated products
(see BØnassy, 1996; and the working paper version of Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). This means that
a rise in the range of available goods raises consumption utility more than proportionately. For
example, ￿v =
￿f
￿f￿1 as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) implies a particular calibration for the love
of variety. Then the relative product price is positively related to the number of ￿rms; in this
particular case, b ￿t = 1
￿f￿1 b Nt. An autonomous increase in product diversity (driven, for example,
by a country opening up to trade) results in a fall in the price index but does not change product
prices. Instead, setting ￿v = 1 as in Floetotto and Jaimovich (2008), eliminates the variety e⁄ect.
This implies an aggregate production function that is linear in the number of intermediate goods.
Then the nominal product price and the price index are equal, and thus b ￿t = 0.
Let us turn to the pricing decision of intermediate goods producers. As in Rotemberg (1982), we
assume that a ￿rm that wishes to change its price incurs an adjustment cost proportional to its
real revenues. Price adjustment costs are higher, the higher is the parameter ￿p and the more the
change in the ￿rms￿nominal price diverges from the term ￿pb ￿C
p;t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿p), where b ￿C
p;t is the
change in the welfare-based price index. Perfectly ￿ exible prices are given by ￿p = 0. We introduce
indexation as in Ravn et al (2010). When ￿p is equal to zero, there is no indexation to past in￿ ation
and we have the case of a purely forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve. When ￿p > 0,
the price adjustment cost is a function of the di⁄erence between the ￿rms￿price change and a
weighted average of past in￿ ation (with weight ￿p) and steady state in￿ ation, where the latter is
equal to 1. For simplicity, we assume that entrants, too, face this price adjustment cost.8 Under
these assumptions, the change in nominal product prices, denoted by b ￿p;t, is a positive function
of its expected future value and a negative function of the markup b ￿t. With indexation, b ￿p;t also
depends on current and lagged welfare-based in￿ ation.
8Bilbiie et al (2007) show that the impulse responses to shocks change negligibly under the alternative assumption
that entrants can change their price costlessly.
8The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) is therefore,
b ￿p;t ￿ ￿pb ￿C
p;t￿1 = ￿￿p
￿
￿ b Nt + b ￿t
￿
+ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N)Etfb ￿p;t+1 ￿ ￿pb ￿C
p;tg; (4)
where ￿p = ("yp ￿ 1)=￿p is its slope and the discount factor ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N) is the product of the
households￿subjective discount factor ￿ and the ￿rms￿exogenous survival rate (1 ￿ ￿N). The term
￿￿p￿ b Nt captures the competition e⁄ect, i.e. the negative e⁄ect of the number of ￿rms on in￿ ation
through desired markups. Substituting the price setting equation (2) and price index (3) into the
NKPC (4) to replace b ￿t, we have an alternative in￿ ation equation,
b ￿p;t ￿ ￿pb ￿C
p;t￿1 = ￿￿p
￿
[￿ + (￿v ￿ 1)] b Nt ￿ c mct
￿
+ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N)Etfb ￿p;t+1 ￿ ￿pb ￿C
p;tg. (5)
Through the variety e⁄ect, the markup is no longer the inverse of real marginal costs, but also
depends positively on the number of ￿rms, see (2). This version of the NKPC shows that in the
presence of love of variety (￿v > 1) or the competition e⁄ect (￿ > 0), in￿ ation ￿ uctuates inversely
with the number of goods and ￿rms. We test below whether these two e⁄ects are important in the
transmission of monetary policy shocks.
Firm pro￿ts b dt depend positively on the markup, on the real product price and on intermediate
￿rm output b yt,
b dt = ("yp ￿ 1)b ￿t + b ￿t + b yt, (6)
where the latter varies negatively with the real product price and positively with ￿nal output b Y C
t ,
b yt = ￿￿fb ￿t + b Y C
t + [(￿f ￿ 1)￿v ￿ ￿f] b Nt: (7)
Final output, b Y C
t = b ￿t + b yt + b Nt, is a weighted average of private consumption b Ct and exogenous
government consumption, which we assume is constant,
b Y C
t = (1 ￿ ￿) b Ct:
The parameter ￿ denotes the steady state share of government consumption in ￿nal output.
We now describe the production function and cost minimisation by ￿rms. The model features two
sectors denoted by j, where j = C;E. The subscript C refers to the sector producing goods, the
subscript E refers to the sector producing ￿rms. Di⁄erentiated intermediate goods and new ￿rms
are produced using labour and physical capital according to a Cobb-Douglas technology with ￿
denoting the (common) capital share. Ks
j;t are capital services and Lj;t is the labour input into
production in sector j. The aggregate production function for goods is given by
b yt + b Nt = ￿ b Ks
C;t + (1 ￿ ￿) b LC;t:
9Similarly, the aggregate production function for new ￿rms is
b NE;t = ￿ b Ks
E;t + (1 ￿ ￿) b LE;t;
where b NE;t is the number of entrants. Factors are rented in competitive markets; their prices are
equal to their marginal revenue products. It follows that the ratio of the wage bill to the rental bill
is constant,
b rk
t + b Ks
C;t = b wt + b Rw
t + b LC;t;
where b rk
t is the real rental rate on capital and b wt is the real wage. Because a fraction ￿w of the





￿wR + (1 ￿ ￿w)
b Rt;
where b Rt is the gross rate of return on riskfree nominal bonds. This speci￿cation follows Christiano
et al (2010) and allows us to estimate the strength of the working capital channel. Real marginal
costs are given by the expression
c mct = ￿b rk
t + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




Due to perfect cross-sectoral factor mobility, factor prices are equalised across sectors and so is the
capital-labour ratio,
b Ks
C;t ￿ b LC;t = b Ks
E;t ￿ b LE;t:
3.2 Households
Households maximise expected lifetime utility. Period t utility is increasing in consumption with ￿C
denoting the degree of risk aversion. Furthermore, consumption displays external habit persistence
of degree b, such that marginal consumption utility is given by




b Ct ￿ bb Ct￿1
￿
:
Utility depends negatively on hours worked b Lt, such that marginal labour disutility is
b UL;t = ￿￿Lb Lt;
where ￿L is the inverse elasticity of labour supply to the real wage. Households have access to
three assets. First, they buy riskfree nominal one-period bonds at the price of one currency unit
10per bond, which pay a gross return b Rt in the next period. The ￿rst order condition for bonds is
the familiar Euler equation
b UC;t = b Rt ￿ Etfb ￿C
p;t+1 ￿ b UC;t+1g.
Second, households buy shares at price b vt and sell them one period later. The return on shares
is given by ￿rm pro￿ts, paid out as dividends, and the capital gain realised in the next period,
discounted appropriately, such that the optimality condition on shares is
b vt = Etfb UC;t+1 ￿ b UC;t + [1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N)] b dt+1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N)b vt+1g.
Firm entry is subject to a ￿ ow adjustment cost measured by the parameter ’N. This speci￿cation
allows us to capture the gradual response of entry to shocks, which is consistent with empirical
evidence on the di⁄usion of production innovations documented in the industrial organisation lit-
erature, see Gort and Klepper (1982). The parameter 0 < ’￿1
N < 1 can be also interpreted as the
fraction of entrants that are unsuccessful. In Beaudry et al￿ s (2006) gold rush model for instance, an
exogenous expansion of product varieties can lead to an ine¢ cient scramble of startups to produce
these new varieties. In the process, resources are wasted as some of these startups fail. Here, we
also assume a non-zero failure rate of startups. We model the failure rate as a positive function of
the change in entry. Therefore, whenever a shock opens up pro￿table opportunities that stimulate
￿rm entry, the failure rate is high initially, but declines as entry rates decelerate. Under these
assumptions, the number of entrants has a forward-looking and a backward-looking component
and depends positively on ￿rm value less the entry cost,
b NE;t ￿ b NE;t￿1 = ’N(b vt ￿ c mct) + ￿Etf b NE;t+1 ￿ b NE;tg. (8)
It takes one period for a successful entrant to turn into a producer. Each period, a fraction ￿N of
active ￿rms and new entrants exit the market, such that the stock of ￿rms evolves according to the
law of motion
b Nt = (1 ￿ ￿N) b Nt￿1 + ￿N b NE;t￿1. (9)
The third asset is physical capital, which agents rent out to ￿rms and entrants. Capital is bought
at price b qt today and is sold tomorrow at a return given by the rental rate b rk
t+1, in addition to the
capital gain b qt+1, discounted appropriately. The ￿rst order condition for capital purchases is
b qt = Etfb UC;t+1 ￿ b UC;t + [1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿K)]b rk
t+1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿K) b qt+1g.
11Capital services depend on the stock of capital b Kt and its utilisation rate b ut,
b Ks
t = b ut + b Kt.
Households choose how intensively capital is utilised. As in Christiano et al (2005), changes in the
utilisation rate are costly. At the optimum, utilisation is adjusted with elasticity ￿￿1
a to changes in
the rental rate of capital,
b ut = ￿￿1
a b rk
t .
Allowing for variable capital utilisation dampens the response of the rental rate of capital to a
shock, which in turn dampens the response of real marginal costs. Investment adjustment costs are
captured by ’K. Current investment b It depends on lagged investment, expected future investment
and the real cost of capital,
b It ￿ b It￿1 = ’Kb qt + ￿Etfb It+1 ￿ b Itg.
The parameter ’K measures the elasticity of investment with respect to current price of installed
capital. Physical capital depreciates at rate ￿K, such that capital accumulation is given by
b Kt = (1 ￿ ￿K) b Kt￿1 + ￿Kb It￿1.
Finally, we introduce di⁄erentiated labour types into the model following Erceg et al (2000). Labour
types are bundled according to a CES aggregator with elasticity ￿w. Quadratic wage adjustment
costs (captured by ￿w) and indexation (captured by ￿w) are introduced, such that wage setting
frictions are analogous to price setting frictions. Wage in￿ ation in period t, b ￿w;t, depends positively
on its expected future value and negatively on the di⁄erence between the real wage b wt and the
marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption b UL;t￿ b UC;t. In the presence of wage
indexation, wage in￿ ation also depends on current and lagged welfare-based in￿ ation,
b ￿w;t ￿ ￿wb ￿C
p;t￿1 = ￿￿w[b wt ￿ (b UL;t ￿ b UC;t)] + ￿Etfb ￿w;t+1 ￿ ￿wb ￿C
p;tg, (10)
where ￿w = (￿w ￿ 1)=￿w is the slope of the wage in￿ ation equation.
3.3 Market Clearing
In equilibrium, total labour supply equals the sum of labour used in the production of goods and








12Similarly, total capital is a weighted average of capital used in the production of goods and capital










































t + b Kt￿1 + b ut
￿
,
where Y is steady state GDP. Total expenditure comprises aggregate consumption, investment in
new ￿rms and new capital, and utilisation adjustment costs. Total income is the sum of dividend
income, labour income and rental income.
3.4 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing. The monetary authority
adjusts the interest rate in response to changes in product price in￿ ation, GDP, and last period￿ s
interest rate.9 The feedback coe¢ cients are, respectively, ￿￿, ￿Y and ￿R, such that
b Rt = ￿R b Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿￿b ￿p;t + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿Y b Yt + ￿R
t ;
where ￿R




The model parameters are partitioned into two groups. The ￿rst collects the parameters which
are calibrated. These include parameters given by ￿rst order moments in the data, as well as
parameters that cannot be separately identi￿ed. Let
 c = (￿;￿L;￿;￿K;￿N;￿p;￿w;￿)
0
denote the vector of calibrated parameters whose values are reported in Table 3.
[ insert Table 3 here ]
9BGM (2007) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008) show that in the presence of appropriate corrective ￿scal policies,
the optimal monetary policy stabilises product prices rather than the welfare-based price index that varies with the
number of di⁄erentiated goods. The latter is typically not observed by the central bank.
13The subjective discount factor is set to ￿ = 0:99, implying a steady-state annualised real interest
rate of 4%. Following Christiano et al (2005), we assume a quadratic labour disutility function,
implying ￿L = 1. As is conventional in the literature, the elasticity of output to capital is set to
￿ = 0:33. In addition, the value ￿K = 0:025 implies an annual capital depreciation rate of 10%.
Following BGM (2007), the ￿rm exit rate ￿N is set to 0:025, so as to ￿t the job destruction rate of
10% per year observed in US data. That value is also close to the estimate of Cecioni (2010), who
documents an annual ￿rm exit rate of about 12% implying that ￿N = 0:03. This parameter plays
a key role for the model￿ s persistence: a higher value of ￿N implies less persistent dynamics. We
assume full indexation of prices and wages as in Christiano et al (2005) and set ￿p = ￿w = 1. When
we estimated these parameters they were driven to their upper bound of unity. The parameters
￿w and ￿w cannot be separately identi￿ed since they appear only jointly in (10). Consequently, we
estimate only ￿w, the slope of the wage in￿ ation equation. The steady state government spending
share in output ￿ is set to 21%.
4.2 Minimum Distance Estimation
The second set of model parameters is estimated by minimum distance estimation. Let   denote






In a ￿rst step, a VAR is estimated as outlined in Section 2. Since the welfare-based price index,
which includes the variety e⁄ect, is unobserved, we posit that measured in￿ ation corresponds to
the variable b ￿p;t in the model. We use the change in the GDP de￿ ator to measure in￿ ation; our
conclusions are robust if we instead use consumer price in￿ ation.
In a second step, the theoretical counterparts of vector ￿, denoted by ￿m( c; ), are obtained from
the theoretical system which has been solved with the AIM algorithm (Anderson and Moore, 1985).
In the model, real variables are de￿ ated by the welfare-based price index, which is not observed.
To obtain data-consistent model variables, we divide each real variable by the real product price
￿t. See BGM (2007) for details. Note that this transformation leaves the variety e⁄ect on welfare
intact. Estimated values of  , denoted by ^  T, ful￿l10
^  T = argmin
 2￿
[￿m( c; ) ￿ ^ ￿T]0WT[￿m( c; ) ￿ ^ ￿T]; (11)
10Since commodity prices CRBt have no counterpart in the DSGE model, the response of this variable is removed
from ￿T for the MDE procedure.
14where WT is a diagonal matrix with the inverse of the asymptotic variances of each element of
^ ￿T along the diagonal. Following Christiano et al (2005), the standard errors of the estimated
parameters are computed using the asymptotic delta function method applied to the ￿rst order
condition associated with (11).
The goodness-of-￿t of the model is quanti￿ed by resorting to bootstrap techniques so as to reveal the
distribution of the minimum distance. Recall that since the weighting matrix WT is not optimal, this
statistic is not distributed as a ￿2 with dim(^ ￿T)￿dim(^  T) degrees of freedom. Bootstrapping the
minimum distance allows us to circumvent this di¢ culty. For each model, 200 bootstrap replications
of the VAR model are generated. For each replication, the parameters of the DSGE models are re-
estimated and the value of the minimum distance is computed. Then, the bootstrapped distribution
of this distance allows us to deduce a p-value for the overidenti￿cation test. This methodology
enables us to check whether the DSGE model passes the overidenti￿cation test implied by the
choice of moments.
5 Results
The discussion of our estimation results is in four parts. We ￿rst assess the overall performance of
our model at reproducing the dynamic responses to a monetary policy shock. Second, we compare
the estimation results of the benchmark model with those obtained from a model without ￿rm
entry, a summary of which is provided in Appendix 2. Third, we evaluate the two hypotheses of
how entry a⁄ects in￿ ation: love of variety and the competition e⁄ect. Finally, we carry out several
counterfactual exercises where we vary one parameter at a time.
5.1 Overall Model Performance
Figure 2 compares the SVAR-based and model-based IRFs of the variables to a monetary policy
shock in the model without ￿rm entry. The variable net business formation has no counterpart in
the model and is therefore removed from the SVAR prior to estimation.
[ insert Figure 2 here ]
As can be seen from Figure 2, the standard model, while being silent on ￿rm dynamics, is rich
enough to capture the other responses to a monetary policy shock very well. It reproduces the
hump-shaped pattern of output, investment and consumption and it does a good job at matching
the persistence of in￿ ation. The magnitude of the response of pro￿ts is quite well replicated, while
15the model fails to reproduce the countercyclical response of markups over the medium run. The
performance of the no-entry model is satisfactory, with a p-value of the overidenti￿cation test equal
to 36% (see Table 4).
Figure 1 above compares the empirical and theoretical responses of the variables in the benchmark
model with endogenous ￿rm entry. The goodness-of-￿t of the model is satisfactory; the model-based
impulse responses stay within the 95% con￿dence bands of the empirical responses. With a p-value
of 26%, the J-test for overidenti￿cation con￿rms that the data do not reject the model. The model
does a very good job at replicating price and wage in￿ ation, investment, consumption, output, and
net entry. It is worth noticing that the benchmark model generates less persistence in the response
of pro￿ts, in comparison with the no-entry model. It does better at replicating the response of
markups, especially over the short run. However, the theoretical responses of pro￿ts and markups
are smaller than their empirical counterparts. This con￿rms the volatility puzzle emphasised in
Colciago and Etro (2010).
5.2 Parameter Estimates
We discuss the estimates of the benchmark model parameters, contrasting them with the parameters
of the no-entry model whenever there is a notable di⁄erence. Table 4 reports the two sets of
estimates.
[ insert Table 4 here ]
Most of the parameter estimates are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, which implies that the cor-
responding friction in the model is needed to match the data impulse responses. One notable
exception is the elasticity of capital utilisation with respect to the rental rate of capital (￿￿1
a ) that
is not signi￿cant. As explained in Christiano et al (2005), this friction is important to generate a
rise in labour productivity in response to a monetary loosening. Intuitively, variable capital utilisa-
tion allows ￿rms to expand production with only a small increase in hours. Since we do not include
productivity in our VAR, this may explain our result.
Consider the estimates of the shock process and the coe¢ cients of the interest rate rule. The stan-
dard error and autocorrelation of the shock are estimated at ￿￿ = 0:15 and ￿￿ = 0:86, respectively.
Interest rate smoothing by the central bank, ￿R equals 0:14 and it is insigni￿cant. Thus, monetary
policy shocks are persistent over the sample, while monetary policy exhibits a negligible degree of
inertia. This is consistent with the ￿nding in Carrillo et al (2007), who argue that the dynamics of
16price and wage in￿ ation are useful for discriminating between policy inertia and persistent shocks.
The point estimate of the interest rate rule coe¢ cient on in￿ ation ￿￿ is above unity (￿￿ = 1:42),
suggesting that monetary policy is active. In the no-entry model, the corresponding parameter
estimate is 1:23 and it is not signi￿cant. Finally, the estimated interest rate rule coe¢ cient on
output ￿Y is driven to its lower bound of zero.
We now turn to the parameters relating to tastes and technology. Consistent with much of the
literature, including Christiano et al (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007), our estimate of the
degree of habit persistence, b, is 0:71. It is slightly lower in the no-entry model (b = 0:66) that
roughly corresponds to the estimates by Christiano et al (2005). This friction helps to reproduce
the sluggishness of consumption. The inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is
estimated at ￿C = 3:22. By assuming a log utility function, Christiano et al (2005) implicitly
calibrate ￿C = 1. Our fairly high estimate may re￿ ect the fact that the consumption series in
our VAR does not include durables. The greater smoothness in consumption calls for a lower
intertemporal substitution elasticity in the model.
Capital investment adjustment cost are somewhat higher in the benchmark model (’K = 7:18)
than in the no-entry model (’K = 5:76). These values are higher than Christiano et al (2005)
but consistent with the result in Poilly (2010). At the extensive investment margin, adjustment
costs are estimated at ’N = 8:22, which is thus comparable to adjustment costs in physical capital
investment. This can be explained by the fact that the empirical responses of investment and net
entry have a similar magnitude. To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst attempt to quantify adjustment
costs in ￿rm entry. Our estimate therefore implies that around 14% of startups are unsuccessful.
Note that this parameter is distinct from the exit shock that hits a fraction ￿N of entrants as well
as established ￿rms.
The working capital channel is parameterised by ￿w, the fraction of the wage bill that must be
￿nanced ahead of production. This parameter is driven to its upper bound of unity in the benchmark
model. Interestingly, in the no-entry model, the estimate of ￿w is smaller (￿w = 0:59), suggesting
that the working capital channel is weaker. The intuition behind this result is the following. A
procyclical impact response of the markup is needed for the model to replicate the observed markup
dynamics over the short run, in addition to the price puzzle and the size of the reduction in pro￿ts.
This requires an increase in marginal costs in response to a monetary contraction, which is delivered
through the working capital channel as marginal costs rise along with borrowing costs. Therefore,
17the good ￿t of the short-run markup response in the benchmark model is explained by the larger
estimated strength of the working capital channel. For a discussion on how the working capital
channel helps to reproduce the price puzzle, see Rabanal (2007) and Henzel et al (2009).
The price elasticity of demand "yp shows up in conjunction with the price stickiness parameter ￿p
in the slope of the NKPC, but it also appears in the pro￿t equation. Consequently, this parameter
can be identi￿ed using pro￿t data. Our estimate of "yp is 2:48 in the benchmark model and 5:10
in the no-entry model. A higher elasticity in the no-entry model reinforces the link between pro￿ts
and markups, see (6). This explains the higher impact response of pro￿ts in the no-entry model, in
comparison with the benchmark model. Two further comments are in order. First, a steady state
markup as high as 60% is not unreasonable in a model with entry costs. This is because ￿rms price
at average cost (including entry costs), such that pro￿ts in excess of the entry costs are zero in
the free-entry equilibrium. In Smets and Wouters￿(2007) model with ￿xed costs, the steady state
markup is estimated at 60%, consistent with our result. Second, evidence based on microeconomic
data suggests that the empirically relevant range of average markups across sectors is rather wide
and includes the values reported here. For instance, Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) report
7% for Textiles and 79% for Public Administration and Defence. The same holds true for estimates
of substitution elasticities across goods ranging from 1:2 for Footwear to 17 for Crude oil (see Broda
and Weinstein, 2006).11 Our estimate of "yp is, however, inconsistent with one of the great ratios
in the model itself. As we show in a separate model appendix, the inverse of the demand elasticity
equals the steady state pro￿t share in consumption output, dN
Y C = 1
"yp. For the US, the average
pro￿t share in post-WWII data is consistent with "yp ￿ 9 rather than 2:5. We leave the resolution
of this puzzle to future research.
Regarding the nominal frictions, we report the slopes of the wage and price in￿ ation curves in
Table 4. The New Keynesian Phillips Curve is slightly ￿ atter in the benchmark model than in the
no-entry model; the estimated slope ￿p is 0:07 and 0:12, respectively. Given our estimates of "yp,
this implies a Rotemberg price stickiness parameter ￿p of 22 and 35, respectively. These ￿gures are
low in comparison with the maximum likelihood estimates in Ireland (2001).12 Interestingly, this
suggests that prices are less sticky in a model with endogenous entry, as suggested by BGM (2007).
11Notice that the within-industry substitution elasticity ￿f is equal to the price elasticity of demand "
yp in the
absence of the competition e⁄ect, i.e. if ￿ = 0, which is what we ￿nd empirically.
12We cannot compare this ￿gure with the numerous estimates of price stickiness that use the Calvo price setting
restriction, because the latter relies on a constant population of price setters.
18The slope of the wage in￿ ation curve ￿w, is signi￿cantly estimated at 0:01 in the benchmark model
(0:03 in the no-entry model).13 We con￿rm Lewis￿(2009) result that wage stickiness is key for
an endogenous-entry model to generate a negative, and hence empirically plausible, response of
￿rm entry to monetary contractions. The reason is the following. The labour requirement for ￿rm
startups makes entry costs depend on real wages. Potential entrants compare entry costs with the
present value of pro￿ts (i.e., ￿rm value). Firm value decreases through a no-arbitrage condition
across assets: the return on shares needs to increase to match the interest rate rise. This happens
through a drop in today￿ s share price relative to tomorrow￿ s. Entry decreases only if entry costs
fall by less than ￿rm value. Wage stickiness suitably dampens the reaction of real wages and, in
turn, of entry costs, resulting in the required drop in entry. While Christiano et al (2005) stress
the importance of wage rigidities to dampen marginal production costs, it is the same friction that
produces realistic entry dynamics through its attenuating e⁄ect on entry costs.
We note that most of the individual parameter estimates are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent across the
two models. For all parameters, except the slope of the NKPC, the 95% con￿dence intervals of the
two models overlap. We now investigate the two potential mechanisms through which entry a⁄ects
in￿ ation.
5.3 Love of Variety and Competition E⁄ect
We estimate ￿v and ￿ in addition to the usual model parameters. These two parameters measure
the variety e⁄ect and the competition e⁄ect, respectively, and thus govern the elasticity of in￿ ation
to the number of ￿rms, see (5). They can be separately identi￿ed using data on markups and entry.
Indeed, ￿v corresponds to the elasticity of markups to net entry, see the price setting equation (2)
and the price index equation (3). We can infer "yp from the elasticity of pro￿ts to the markup,
see (6). The within-industry substitution elasticity ￿f is determined residually; it is related to the
competition e⁄ect parameter ￿ and the steady-state demand elasticity "yp as follows,
￿f = [￿("yp ￿ 1) + 1]"yp.
Our estimation results indicate that ￿ is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. This suggests that
strategic interactions and the competition e⁄ect do not help to reproduce the impulse responses to
a monetary policy shock. We o⁄er two explanations for this result. First, Figure 1 shows that on
13In the wage setting case, it is valid to compute the Calvo stickiness probability from the estimated slope of the




￿w(1+￿w=￿L) , and assuming a wage mark-up of 10% (i.e. ￿w = 11),
the corresponding Calvo wage stickiness parameter ￿w equals 0:75 in the benchmark model.
19impact, the markup reacts pro-cyclically to a monetary policy shock in the data. Therefore, the
model with a competition e⁄ect ￿ts the data less well at short horizons since it produces a (more)
countercyclical markup. Second, a monetary policy shock leads to a procyclical response of net
business formation. In the model, however, a high value of ￿ implies a strong negative elasticity of
in￿ ation to entry, through the NKPC. The negative co-movement between these two variables is
at odds with the empirical dynamics resulting from interest rate shocks. Cecioni (2010) estimates
the NKPC (4) and reports ￿ = 1:10. Her estimates suggest that a 1% increase in the number of
￿rms lowers annual in￿ ation signi￿cantly by 0:14 percentage points. This ￿nding is not necessarily
inconsistent with our results if the competition e⁄ect is more important in the presence of other
types of shocks, e.g. technology shocks.
Our estimate of the degree of love for variety is ￿v = 1:48. This is slightly lower than the Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) value ￿v = ￿f=(￿f ￿ 1) used in BGM (2007), which in our estimation is 1:67.
However, our estimate is signi￿cantly higher than the calibration in Floetotto and Jaimovich (2008),
who implicitly assume ￿v = 1. Consequently, our ￿nding suggests that the variety e⁄ect is supported
by the data. We are not aware of any other study that estimates the degree of love of variety.
5.4 Counterfactual Exercises
To build intuition for the functioning of our model, we conduct several counterfactual exercises.
We use the benchmark parameter estimates and vary one parameter at a time to derive the model-
based impulse response functions (i.e., without re-estimation). Figures 3 and 4 show the IRFs of
pro￿ts, net entry, in￿ ation and the markup for di⁄erent speci￿cations of the working capital channel
(￿w), nominal rigidities (￿p and ￿w), the competition e⁄ect (￿) and the love of variety (￿v). Each
speci￿cation is analysed in detail in the next subsections.
[ insert Figure 3 here ]
Working Capital
We have seen that the working capital channel is much stronger in the endogenous-entry model
than in the no-entry model. Here we show that it is a key assumption to replicate the sign of the
markup response on impact. This is because the interest rate in￿ uences the markup through its
e⁄ect on real marginal costs; an increase in Rt implies a negative response of markups. In the left
panel of Figure 3, we set the parameter ￿w to 1, 0:5 and 0.
20From the ￿gure, it is clear that a stronger working capital channel makes the markup more pro-
cyclical while making pro￿ts more volatile. In particular, pro￿ts are only slightly responsive to
monetary policy shocks for ￿w = 0. Interestingly, the larger the value of ￿w, the stronger the net
entry response. Again, the increase in the interest rate has a positive impact on real marginal costs
that reduces net entry. Equation (8) shows that this e⁄ect is dampened when the adjustment cost,
’N, is high.
Nominal Rigidities
In the following, we investigate how price and wage rigidities a⁄ects the model￿ s dynamics. We
consider the model IRFs under the assumption of sticky wages and ￿ exible prices (setting ￿p = 0),
as well as under sticky prices and ￿ exible wages (setting ￿w = 0). See the left panel of Figure 3.
In the sticky-wage model, markups and pro￿ts hardly respond to a monetary policy shock, while the
response of net entry is larger in comparison with the benchmark model. We notice a counterfactual
pattern of in￿ ation, which rises on impact. This can be explained by the presence of the working
capital channel that drives up real marginal costs. Setting price stickiness ￿p to a small value makes
in￿ ation very responsive to the pattern of real marginal costs.
The sticky-price model produces counterfactual increases in markups and pro￿ts. This happens
because wages are ￿ exible, such that real wages fall, reducing in turn real marginal costs. Through
the NKPC, in￿ ation mirrors the markup response. The rise in pro￿ts dampens the drop in entry.
These ￿ndings underline the importance of wage stickiness in the endogenous-entry model.
[ insert Figure 4 here ]
Competition E⁄ect
We now analyse how the competition e⁄ect modi￿es the transmission of monetary policy shocks
by setting ￿ to 1:1. As expected, a higher value of ￿ makes markups more countercyclical over the
medium run, and more persistent. The fall in net entry also becomes more persistent. In addition,
the output drop is stronger (not shown), amplifying the fall in in￿ ation, even if the elasticity of
in￿ ation to the number of ￿rms is higher. These results con￿rm that the competition e⁄ect is a
key model element to generate countercyclical movements of markups.
21Variety E⁄ect
How does love of variety change the propagation mechanism of the model? Our benchmark estimate
of parameter ￿v is 1:48. The right panel of Figure 4 shows the IRFs of our variables in the
benchmark estimation and when love of variety is absent, corresponding to ￿v = 1. Recall that,
since the number of ￿rms is predetermined, the variety e⁄ect is zero on impact and small in the
short run. Net entry falls by less and returns to steady state faster when the love of variety is
higher. Without the variety e⁄ect, the responses of entry and pro￿ts remain persistently negative.
In other words, the variety e⁄ect reduces persistence. This is because by lowering the welfare-based
price index, entry raises the stochastic discount factor (the growth rate of the marginal utility of
one currency unit). The dampening e⁄ect on in￿ ation is visible here in that in￿ ation declines less
when the variety e⁄ect is present. The response of markups is not strongly a⁄ected by the love of
variety parameter. This explains why our model with endogenous entry does not improve by much
the ￿t of the markup response as compared with the no-entry model.
6 Conclusion
The growing literature on endogenous entry and the extensive margin in business cycles has been
mainly theoretical up to now. We estimate a medium-scale DSGE model which includes endoge-
nous ￿rm entry as in Bilbiie et al (2007) in addition to many other frictions. More speci￿cally,
we minimise the distance between the model impulse responses to a monetary policy shock and
their empirical counterparts in an identi￿ed vector autoregression. The exercise is comparable to
Christiano et al (2005), who abstract from ￿rm dynamics. Our VAR includes pro￿ts, markups and
net business formation along with other standard macroeconomic variables. The model is successful
at matching the empirical impulse responses, especially that of ￿rm entry. However, the predicted
responses of markups and pro￿ts are smaller than in the data, con￿rming the volatility puzzle noted
in Colciago and Etro (2010). Our parameter estimates are largely una⁄ected by the introduction
of ￿rm entry. There is no evidence of a competition e⁄ect by which a rise in the number of ￿rms
reduces desired markups and hence dampens in￿ ation in an expansion. Indeed this e⁄ect does
not help to capture the countercyclical movement of markups observed in the data. Instead, our
results support the love of variety e⁄ect: increased product diversity through ￿rm entry lowers the
welfare-based price index. Thus, markups rise and under sticky prices, in￿ ation declines.
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Appendix 1: Markup Measure
In this section, we show how to compute an empirical measure of the goods price markup derived
from our model.14 Our markup proxy, denoted by e ￿t, is based on the inverse labour share. It
is close to the concept proposed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) that corrects for overhead
labour, i.e. labour used to set up new production lines. This measure has been used in many
studies, including BGM (2007) and Colciago and Etro (2010) in the endogenous-entry literature.
The ￿rst order condition for labour demand can be manipulated to produce a relation between the
markup and the inverse labour share,
e ￿t =










denotes the ratio of the wage bill to consumption output. Following Colciago and
Etro (2010), we assume that the share of workers employed in startup activities
LE;t
Lt is constant at
0:2, such that Lt
LC;t = 1:25: The parameter ￿ is set to 0:33, as before. The interest rate Rw
t is not
14In a model without ￿rm entry, the markup is simply expressed as the inverse labor share.
25observed. Recall that this variable re￿ ects the borrowing costs to ￿rms that have to pay a fraction
￿w of the wage bill in advance. Given our estimate ￿w = 1, we set this borrowing cost equal to the
Federal Funds Rate.
Appendix 2: DSGE Model without Entry
b Y C
t = ￿ b Ks




￿wR + (1 ￿ ￿w)
b Rt
b rk
t + b Ks
t = b wt + b Rw
t + b Lt
c mct = ￿b rk
t + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




t = (1 ￿ ￿) b Ct
0 = b ￿t + c mct
b dt = (￿f ￿ 1)b ￿t + b yt
b ￿p;t ￿ ￿pb ￿p;t￿1 = ￿￿pb ￿t + ￿Etfb ￿p;t+1 ￿ ￿pb ￿p;tg




b Ct ￿ bb Ct￿1
￿
b UL;t = ￿￿Lb Lt
b Ks
t = b ut + b Kt
b ut = ￿￿1
a b rk
t
b UC;t = b Rt ￿ Etfb ￿p;t+1 ￿ b UC;t+1g
b qt = Et
n
b UC;t+1 ￿ b UC;t + [1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿K)]b rk
t+1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿K) b qt+1
o
b It ￿ b It￿1 = ’Kb qt + ￿Etfb It+1 ￿ b Itg
























b Kt = (1 ￿ ￿K) b Kt￿1 + ￿Kb It￿1
b Rt = ￿R b Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿￿b ￿p;t + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿Y b Yt + ￿R
t


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table 3. Calibrated Parameters
￿ Discount factor 0:99
￿L Inverse elasticity of labour supply to real wage 1
￿ Capital share in production 0:33
￿K Depreciation rate of capital 0:025
￿N Firm exit rate 0:025
￿p Price indexation 1
￿w Wage indexation 1
￿ Steady-state government spending share in output 0:21
29Table 4. Results of Minimum Distance Estimation (1954Q4-1995Q2)
Entry Model No-Entry Model
Monetary Policy Shock








Nominal and Real Frictions





























’N Entry adjustment cost 8:223 (1:796)
[4:70;11:74]
n.a:




￿w Fraction of wage bill paid in advance 1:000 (￿) 0:589 (0:190)
[0:22;0:96]
￿v Love of variety 1:485 (0:205)
[1:15;1:82]
n.a:

















The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the parameter estimates and the p-values of the
J-statistics, respectively. A star (￿) refers to a constraint imposed during the estimation stage to avoid
convergence problems. The numbers in square brackets are the 95% con￿dence intervals around each point
estimate.
30Figure 1: Entry Model : Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock.






















































































































































































































Entry Model: SVAR-based IRFs (solid lines) and model-based IRFs (lines with circles) (multiplied by
100). Grey areas correspond to 95% con￿dence intervals.
31Figure 2: No-Entry Model: Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock.
































































































































































































No-entry Model: SVAR-based IRFs (solid lines) and model-based IRFs (lines with circles) (multiplied by
100). Grey areas correspond to 95% con￿dence intervals.
32Figure 3: Counterfactual Exercises.


































































Counterfactual Exercises: Left panel: change in working capital channel (￿w). Right panel: change in
price stickiness (￿p) and in wage stickiness (￿w).
33Figure 4: Counterfactual Exercises.









































Counterfactual Exercises: Left panel: change in competition e⁄ect (￿). Right panel: change in love of
variety (￿v).
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